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Embracing Žižek’s Unapologetic 




Che Vuoi?  What do you want from me?1  
For intellectuals, scientists or literary specialists, the question takes 
a precise form: what place does our activity occupy in the world, 
what role does it play? What are we as intellectuals in this world? For 
what is an intellectual if not the product of a history and a society in 
which the division of labour imposes upon us this role and its blinkers? 
Have not the revolutions that we have known or seen announced the 
birth of a different type of intellectual? If so, what is our role in this 
transformation?2
How is it that from within contemporary deliberations of intellectual freedom 
one might elicit unfreedom as a possible site for emancipation? Further, might 
this space enable an appropriate response to or even a formalisation of the 
boundaries of freedom considered as a socio-political ideological deployment? 
Freedom and the intellect certainly have an affinity in that both construct 
a scene for emancipation, but they are otherwise mutually exclusive. The 
incompleteness of this tenuous relationship is not always obvious in that it 
touches on the Real of enjoyment. For Slavoj Žižek freedom is a problematic 
dialectic whereas enjoyment is a political act. Both freedom and enjoyment are 
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beset with tensions and struggles of their own and when combined they capture 
the subject within distinctive ideological tentacles. In addition, the will to enjoy 
is both a political drive and where the big Other3 is most visible as a means of 
critiquing ideology. 
 Žižek’s concept of the event is a formalisation, an abstraction in which the 
political is pivotal and essential for social transformation. Žižek states:
At first approach, an event is this, the effect that seems to exceed its 
causes – and the space of an event is that which opens up the gap 
that separates an effect from its causes… our first tentative definition 
of event as an effect which exceeds its causes thus brings us back 
to an inconsistent multiplicity: is an event a change in the way reality 
appears to us, or is it a shattering transformation of reality itself?4  
Žižek’s concept of the event is an important starting point from which to 
consider the dialectical tension between freedom and unfreedom precisely 
because its provocative interrogation pulls the rug from beneath any claim to 
the legitimacy of authority and consistency. It is here that I interrogate feminism. 
In throwing into crisis the quest for freedom which underlies much feminist 
discourse, Žižek is challenging those ideological conditions, including freedom, 
on which the assertions of feminism rest.  First and foremost, it is crucial to 
understand ideology and the conditions of its emergence and it is here that we 
must turn to Althusser when he states:
Practical ideologies are complex formations which shape notions-
representations-images into behaviour-conduct-attitude-gestures. The 
ensemble functions as practical norms that govern the attitude and 
the concrete positions men adopt towards the real objects and real 
problems of their social and individual existence, and towards their 
history.5 
Althusser poses a significant challenge here: that there is a distinction between 
the practicing intellectual and one who functions within the ideological position 
already constituted to legitimate knowledge. Althusser also necessarily invokes 
the historicisation of this as a problem to be reckoned with.6 We must take 
Althusser seriously and question whether intellectual freedom is a sincere 
position within the current academy, and more so, whether to be an intellectual 
today merely serves the institution and those ideologies which constitute 
legitimate knowledge. Although the functioning of feminism is founded on 
historical events of emancipatory politics, it can be argued that today’s feminism 
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has lost its vigour and that as a result, freedom is foregrounded more within 
an interdisciplinary praxis rather than as an ontological crisis. This disjuncture 
should be concerning for both intellectual freedom and political activism, 
and furthermore it has implications for the emancipatory subject. This paper 
proposes the concept of unfreedom to be an important Zizekian-Lacanian 
elucidation and provocation for contemporary feminist theory and, possibly also, 
for global feminist discourse. 
 Firstly, why is Lacanians psychoanalysis so apt a discipline for deliberating 
freedom? Alenka Zupancic provides a cogent response when she states:
Every satisfaction of a need brings with it the possibility of a 
supplementary satisfaction, deviating from the object and aim of 
a given demand while pursuing its own goal, thus constituting a 
seemingly dysfunctional detour. It is this detour, or the space which 
it opens up, that constitutes not only the field of the catalogued 
‘sexual aberrations,’; but also the ground, as well as the energy source, 
for what is generally referred to as human culture in its highest 
accomplishments.7
For Zupancic and Lacanians alike, the ontology of the sexed subject eclipses 
that of gendered constitutions resultant from postmodernism. This is an 
important foundational position from which to commence a critical return to 
feminism because it directly attends to desire and its relation to the body as 
contingent on unconscious forces rather than on social constructionism. More 
specifically, Žižek’s engagement with Lacan is a way of elucidating how truth 
can emerge from human reality. Žižek states that Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
“does not show an individual the way to accommodate him – or herself to 
the demands of social reality; instead it explains how something like reality 
constitutes itself in the first place”.8 This provides a well-poised position 
from which to interrogate freedom and truth as materialist emergence that is 
responded to as an event.
 Much has been written about the concept of freedom, specifically 
its intersections with power, knowledge and social transformation. Such 
intersections are at the core of feminist scholarship and provocation. The 
‘Thing’ of freedom for feminism is the figure of the woman, emancipated from 
patriarchal and consumerist strongholds.  Historically there have been many 
events such as women’s franchise in the West, which attest to increasing female 
political participation. This has been aided and abetted by three waves of 
feminism, also arguably by today’s post-feminism which, however, suffers from a 
different kind of essentialist discourse – that of technology. Under technological 
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essentialism9 the current tendency to reduce freedom into sets of comfortable 
and socially acceptable media identifications, obfuscates the crucial condition 
that freedom is always in dialectical tension with unfreedom. Unfreedom is 
best understood as symbolic forced choice, reduced freedom or even as an 
acceptance of what cannot be changed. Žižek recognises this when stating, 
“We feel free because we lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom.”10 
Here, Žižek is referring to the unsayableness of unfreedom because it aligns 
with the Real; thus freedom becomes an Imaginary fantasy and unfreedom, the 
repressed Real. An emphasis on unfreedom allows for critiquing the rhetorical 
encouragement of the fantasy that we are now freer than ever. Certainly, Žižek 
puts the concept and praxis of freedom on the couch: his Lacanian interrogation 
of freedom provokes the deadlock of desire and perversion as a useful position 
from which to map those political dimensions which ideologically structure 
freedom as desirable. Desire for the fantasy of freedom is greater than the 
excess it promises. It is here that Žižek is faithful to Lacan in his formalisation 
that desire, in the deadlock with perversion, ensures that ideological fantasies 
such as freedom remain captured by the cultural super-ego. 
 For Lacan desire is structured by Law:
The law creates desire in the first place by creating interdiction. 
Desire is essentially the desire to transgress, and for there to be a 
transgression, it is first necessary that there be prohibition.11 
If there is no desire for transgression, Law becomes redundant and ceases to 
function. Fulfilment offered through transgression of the Law is forever enticing 
but always an ultimate failure because through a confrontation with excess, the 
only fallback position is to the original desire for transgression. Arguably, this 
is also an indication of postmodernism’s failure in its emancipatory function.  
What this means is that in the context of postmodern relativism, there is no 
truth to be fought for, and more pertinently no link between truth and freedom. 
Thus transgression itself becomes only a relative state that is reduced to the 
politics of identity and self-interest. Žižek has linked perversion with several 
postmodern liberal strategies which seek out idiosyncratic paths towards 
enjoyment. For Žižek the need to transgress is essential to both desire and to 
the sustainment of Law. But more than this, Žižek suggests that trangressive 
acts made in the name of freedom are no more than ruses to maintain their 
own dialectical integrity. It could be argued that at this conjuncture Žižek and 
feminism part ways. Feminism attempted to confront those ideological scaffolds 
which served to subjugate women by instituting a different discursive, woman-
centred framework and in this it was to some extent successful. However, Žižek 
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in his critical return to ideology and adoption of Lacan, poses a significant 
challenge by suggesting that as an emancipatory subject one must be willing 
to break away from identifying with the support of ideology in order to escape 
the false consciousness of freedom. It is here that we must return to Althusser’s 
theorisation of ideology: “an ideological proposition is a proposition that, 
while it is the symptom of a reality other than that of which it speaks, is a false 
proposition to the extent that it concerns the object of which it speaks.”12 If we 
take seriously Althusser’s theorisation, under scrutiny here is the feminist mantra 
of the liberated woman: how might a reformulation of freedom be attainable 
and where does this leave the problem of enjoyment? 
 Feminism and particularly the historicisation of its activist trajectory are 
closely interrogated by Žižek.13 Although his dismissal of feminism for being no 
more than desire for the postmodern Other, is somewhat glib (if not accurate), 
his critique is otherwise valid and useful for feminism. The most obvious point 
of tension between Žižek and feminism lies in its claim of universality. Žižek is 
unapologetic about his position that if there is no continuity between desire 
and transgression, then there can be no claim to universality. His main feminist 
protagonist, Judith Butler, who he accuses of falsely celebrating transgressive 
acts in the name of feminism, argues that transgression and thus freedom 
are located outside the subject and within systematic and political contexts. 
For Butler, what must be addressed is not Žižek’s critique of subordination as 
distinctly feminist, but rather its appropriation of the Symbolic co-ordinates of 
the system. Here, for Butler is where true freedom resides and where the subject 
fully emancipates herself. 
 Žižek, however offers a cogent retort, his fidelity to Lacan 
uncompromised:
On one hand, [Butler] overestimates the subversive potential of 
disturbing the function of the big Other [the oppressive system] 
through the practices of performative reconfiguration/displacement: 
such practices ultimately support what they are intended to subvert, 
since the very field of ‘transgression’ is already taken into account, 
even engendered by the hegemonic big Other… On the other 
hand, Butler does not allow for the radical gesture of the thorough 
restructuring of the hegemonic order in its totality.14 
 
Nonetheless, feminism is well poised as a form of intellectual activism which can 
critically examine unfreedom as perpetuating a space which both enables social 
transformation and challenges problematic reproductions of hegemonic notions 
of freedom which are orthodox and ideologically formalised. In discussing 
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freedom and the failure of its symbolisation, and without appealing to authority, 
how might we consider unfreedom as a distinctive and irreducible Lacanian-
feminist response in order to draw the parameters of conflict and address the 
problems of value and participation? 
 For Žižek, the outcome of these matters is not entirely clear, except 
that for him they inhabit a space of neo-communism, a position he vigorously 
defends.15 This aside, what Žižek offers as social protagonist, cultural critic and 
provocateur is that Lacanian psychoanalysis has the important function of being 
a political space for transformation. Subjects of language are political subjects 
in that they can speak of historical, social and personal events. More poignantly, 
subjects speak of how particular events can leave them in a state of subjective 
destitution. Such destitution has been a focus for many feminist scholars, 
particularly post third wave theorists such as Butler, who employ Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Both Butler and Žižek interpellate subjective destitution situated 
both within and beyond the contentions of dominant ideologies.16
 It is a function of the feminist scholar to scrutinise that which captivates 
us in order to identify that which resembles what we desire. Desire has been 
theorised over the years by feminist scholars, both as a way to harness 
subjective transformation and affirmation as well as critically engage desires 
aligning with capitalist and patriarchal ideologies. Let us now undertake a 
feminist short-circuit reading of Žižek. Although Žižek and feminism might be 
considered antithetic, nevertheless, Žižek is a philosopher who offers powerful 
challenges with uncompromising theoretical rigour regarding the problems and 
issues of contemporary society, including those faced by feminism:
My point is that the position which I’m attacking, the position of 
‘Let’s just demand our piece of the cake within the global order,’ that 
already is the position of domination. It’s not that I want all while the 
others want only their piece of the cake. Let’s go to feminism. I claim 
that the only alternative to such [an] approach to feminism is, I think, 
what is the worst catastrophe for feminism, which is this grounding 
of feminism in the pre-Cartesian tradition. I have in mind here the 
claims that the Cartesian modern-age subject is a male chauvinist 
subject, before whose appearance there still was a proper place of 
women within the social body. Of course it was — the subordinated 
place inscribed in nature itself. I claim that all this search for some 
primordial matriarchal society, whatever, where you would have a 
more appropriate role, place, within the social body of women is, I 
think, a catastrophe because, again, even if you find there some kind 
of privileged position of women, it’s defined as position in kind of a 
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total organic order, it’s simply a specific position. I claim that feminism 
in the modern sense becomes possible only with this Cartesian notion 
of subject which is the anti-subject, the denaturized subject, subject 
with no natural properties. It’s only in this way that you can ground 
radical feminism in the modern sense. Any return to this old organic 
notion, any feminism which plays the game of, ‘in the modern age the 
masculine principle was expressed too strongly, we need to reestablish 
the balance between the feminine and the masculine principle.’ The 
moment that you accept this, you are lost.17 
Žižek throws in crisis not only feminism as a problematic emancipatory 
force, but he also argues for a disintegration of the authority underpinning 
postmodern interpretations of it.  For Žižek the proliferation of reaction against 
intolerance is in part an immersion in the enjoyment of unfreedom because it 
cannot guarantee transformation. In this case, we are enjoying what we do not 
have. Žižek critiques the usefulness of the Cartesian binary for understanding 
feminism and the relations between the sexes in light of postmodern 
constructions of gender fluidity and Lacan’s theory of sexuation and the divided 
subject, a criticism which might perplex some feminist scholars. Close inspection 
of Žižek’s response to the question of power deliberately draws upon Lacanian 
psychoanlysis.18 Here Žižek acknowledges that women are more powerful than 
men because of their unknowability as a fantasy object and the failure of this 
to be fully appropriated by and within the Phallic order, indeed that we are all 
subjects of lack, loss and repetition. 
 Žižek’s critique of Butler on the structure and function of the 
emancipatory subject is illuminating: 
 
[D]id you notice how Judith Butler, in every subsequent book radically 
changes her position while pretending, ‘I’m just clarifying, I was 
misunderstood before?’ It’s absolutely clear that the Psychic Life of 
Power radically turns around her first book, that is to say, Gender 
Trouble. Because it precisely, aggressively — and I wholly agree with 
her here — reasserts the notion of fundamental loss, renouncing 
passionate attachment, and so on. But I want to say is that she goes 
into this poetry of the marginal, the one who is dislocated, half-
excluded, and so on. I have two problems with this poetry of the 
power discourse that wants to centralize, systematize everything, and 
then we should speak on behalf of those who are excluded without 
proper place. First I claim that here is the opposition between globality 
and universality. These half-excluded are the site of universality in the 
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most radical, strict philosophical sense it can be developed. 
 The second thing where I disagree with her apropos of this 
discourse of marginal disavowed agents is: why does she think that 
when we speak about something which is disavowed, repressed, 
that, to put it in somewhat simplistic and ironic terms, it’s always the 
good guys, ours, who are repressed? I claim isn’t it that the power 
itself functions, the power itself has to disavow its own founding 
operation?… This is what interests me, this obscene underside of 
power, how power, in order to function, has to repress not the 
opponent, but has to split in itself. You have a whole set of measures 
which power uses, but disavows them; uses them, but they are 
operative but not publicly acknowledged. This is for me the obscenity 
of power… the whole set of unwritten rules on which power relies.19
Žižek has accused feminism of engulfing and in some ways, emulating, 
postmodernism in its discursive reading of power. Nevertheless, Butler attends 
to power as arguably the most cogent of postmodern projects when she states:
We are used to thinking about power as what subordinates, sets 
underneath, and relegates to a lower order … But if, following Foucault, 
we understand power as forming the subject as well as providing the 
very condition of its existence and the trajectory of desire, then power 
is not simply what we oppose, but also, in a strong sense, what we 
depend on for our existence and what we harbour and preserve in the 
beings that we are.20
Whereas Butler understands power to be emancipatory, Žižek inverts this 
by framing powerlessness as equally so, and this is also at the core of his 
interpretation of Christian theology. Although both Žižek and Butler seek to 
articulate the political problem of freedom and emancipation, specifically 
through a reading of power as ideologically symbolised, Žižek’s criticisms of 
Butler are not without validity and should give feminist scholars pause for 
thought. In implying that some feminists indulge in petit bourgeois musings, 
it might be supposed that feminism had lost its way only to return in the 
form of uncritical neo-pragmatic scholarship. Butler’s fall back position to the 
Foucauldian formalisation of power21 becomes somewhat redundant under 
Žižek’s criticism and thus merely creates either an ontological deadlock or 
ironically, a position of privilege where one deliberates on power only by virtue 
of being a powerful subject. Žižek resists this indulgence by offering that, when 
it comes to analysis of freedom, it always contains the contradiction that one 
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can practice freedom whilst violating that of others. This is especially so under 
neoliberalism where freedom comes at a financial cost to someone else. This 
has not entirely escaped feminist scholarship, which sometimes offers that 
feminist political struggle may involve the surrender of the possibility of choice. 
Certainly, this is the basis of non-white, non-Western critique of white Western 
feminism.
 When Žižek critiques feminism as emanating from postmodernism it is 
important to consider his challenge.  By employing Lacan, Žižek insists that, “[t]
he usual critique of patriarchy fatally neglects the fact that there are two fathers. 
On one hand, there is the Oedpial father, the Symbolic-dead father … on the 
other hand there is the obscene super-ego… the ‘Master of Enjoyment’.”22 The 
latter allows both a structure and prohibition of enjoyment, which is adopted 
by the subject in so far as it animates the fantasy of enjoyment. It is crucial to 
understand Žižek’s version of postmodernism as arguably lying more within 
the bounds of form than of content. That is, how situations occur together 
with their outcomes are the result of ideological misrecognition. For example, 
the problematic division between the consumptions of mass and those of high 
culture – a modernist conundrum – is central to Žižek’s critical project. Similarly, 
with the wider feminist project being about how the body is implicated and 
re-appropriated into patriarchal and power relations, it could be argued that 
feminism too shares this tension around misrecognition. For Lacan, the body 
resides in the order of the Real and in order to understand this, we need to 
appropriate the fantasy dimension to this spectre, for the body not to appear 
unrecognisable and distorted. For feminism, the body is a site of the political 
and although Žižek does not depoliticise the body he includes the problem of 
how power has been appropriated:
[T]his spectre of woman’s power structurally depends on male 
domination: it remains its shadowy double, its retroactive effect and, 
as such, its inherent moment. For that reason, the idea of bringing 
the shadowy woman’s power to light and acknowledging its central 
position publicly is the most  subtle way of succumbing to the 
patriarchal trap.23  
It could be argued that here Žižek is dismissing feminism as submerging the 
figure of the woman within a brand of problematic identity politics. On the other 
hand, Žižek’s provocation might well ignite a feminist imaginary surrounding 
freedom. Colette Soler speaks to this tension when she locates the body as a 
product of culture, that having a body means one is able to appropriate it into 
culture, do something with it.24 Freedom is a problem implicated in this act 
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because although one can choose whether or how to act, one cannot choose 
one’s jouissance. For Žižek, the notion of freedom is not only a dialectic with its 
shadowy double, but also in its failure, freedom becomes a foundational link to 
what is impossible to articulate or realise. Here, the body itself is not at stake but 
the fantasy of its possibility to provide emancipatory function certainly is.  
 In the Sublime Object of Ideology,25 Žižek insists on drawing a line in the 
sand between his theoretical boundaries and those of postmodernism, although 
it is interesting to note that he has since distanced himself from this earlier 
text. There Žižek claims we are interpellated through ideology, largely without 
question and consider it oppressive only if it does not align with our intentions, 
which are to try and find a way to live under the aegis of late stage capitalism. 
When this fails – as Marx rightly cautioned – we are utterly confounded, 
demanding to know why we are the mere ‘ninety-nine per cent’. And yet, is 
there not an extreme perversion at work in the collective reductionism of this 
‘ninety-nine per cent’ identity politics, undertaken primarily by white, Western 
liberal male elites?
 From this perspective it can be argued that Žižek operates as a critical 
feminist scholar in claiming that we need to critically engage ideology in order 
to understand those hidden and oppressive forces which govern our day-to-day 
lives. His demand for absolute difference, the radical break, is one that feminism 
has for long been grappling with. For those of Lacanian feminist persuasions, 
Lacan’s claim that there is no meta-language is crucial to understanding 
the plight and fight feminist scholars have been tantalised with. It is at this 
conjuncture where one is not bound by ideological conditions of what it means 
to be a woman or a man, that the possibility of freedom resides. However, Žižek 
reminds us not be carried away with our jouissance in these possibilities for 
freedom because they are illusory. The concept of freedom is predicated on a 
lie or a form of denial because under capitalist conditions, when one is afforded 
freedom, someone else is denied. In true Marxist style, Žižek compels us to think 
about how we obtain and sustain privilege and status, although even before 
Žižek, feminist scholars and activists were pondering this. 
 Freedom has become a commodified utility and feminism has arguably 
played a part in this misdirection. Freedom is a guise in the ideological 
conditions which structure the Symbolic. Let us turn to Žižek’s reading of Marx 
to explain this. Žižek states: 
[W]e must break the appearance according to which the value of 
a com-modity depends on pure hazard – on an accidental interplay 
between supply and demand, for example. We must accomplish the 
crucial step of conceiving the hidden ‘meaning’ behind the commodity-
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form, the signi-fication ‘expressed’ by this form; we must penetrate the 
‘secret’ of the value of commodities.26  
The commodification of feminism has become a class fetish. The new problem 
emerging from feminism is not freedom, but freedom of choice and this is a 
problem resulting from feminism’s appropriation of and collusion with capitalism 
and the neoliberal political economy. Here the demand upon women by other 
women to be and do everything is an ultra commodified expression of feminism, 
whereby the dominant accepted value of ‘female’ within feminism – or rather, 
left-wing social democratic feminism – is the reduction to the economic 
identity of the female worker as commodity. Under this accepted version of 
freedom, freedom becomes a commodity with an exchange value in the market. 
When one feels free, the efficacy of the market is not interrogated as being 
ideologically problematic. I claim that feminism needs to dispense with the 
illusion that we can all act as if we can become free, but instead return to the 
position where freedom is a struggle, impossible to fully articulate. This position 
reinvigorates not only feminism, but also freedom and choice as partial forms of 
enjoyment, notwithstanding that they are unrealisable. 
 Thus feminism presents as a forced choice for the subject, a choice which 
seeks to throw the problem of freedom into crisis. Here, feminism is not a 
position of leisure and privilege, it is a political struggle rather than an appeal to 
consensus. For freedom to be fully interrogated as a formalisation of feminism 
a return to robust critique, a form of intellectual activism which addresses 
how freedom has failed in its traditional and postmodern symbolisations, is 
essential.  Freedom antagonises the Symbolic and touches on the Real because 
it fails to resolve the deadlock with desire. This deadlock is repeated within 
each permutation, as there emerge new ways to enjoy, even partially, other 
orientations, all the while asking the unavoidable albeit unanswerable question: 
Che vuoi? 
 Žižek signals Lacan’s position that one is attached to one’s subjectivization 
as constitutive of how one presents. Suffering, pain and compromise make 
sense under this structure. This kind of reflexive logic entails that the fantasies 
of wholeness and completeness remain external to the conditions in which 
the subject undertakes them. The feminist fantasies of complete freedom and 
equality in the hallowed company of great emancipatory female figures, is no 
exception. However, this too allows for a problematic and unreflexive logic 
premised on historicisation. Feminism is a scene in which the fantasy of freedom 
takes on particular ideological contours in the attempt to subvert the big Other 
of patriarchal consumer society. This is problematic in that feminism’s claim 
of a new freedom remains within consumerism. The spectacle of the suffering 
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feminist is of one who enjoys unfreedom and fully submitting to this is crucial 
to passionate attachment as a way of disentangling oneself from the bounds 
of subjective presuppositions. The great irony and fundamental paradox is 
that when one touches on the Real, one is inevitably horrified by getting too 
close to the object of desire. Here, the Real is a spectacle which appropriates 
its fundamental opposite. Thus there is inevitable pleasure and virtue in the 
attempt to subvert, in particular, perceptions of social immobility. One enjoys 
unfreedom and the struggle it entails in trying to mobilise social transformation.  
Similarly one takes pleasure in the scholarship which unfreedom beckons. 
Maybe feminists need to return to a Žižekian enjoyment (or similarly, what 
Judith Butler calls ‘passionate (dis)attachment’) as an uncompromising position 
of the intellectual super-ego. Here, identity politics considered as a codified 
ideological transgression falls away and in its place are norms and prohibitions 
one is allowed to both enjoy and transgress. In place of identity politics is 
acknowledgement of misrecognition of, in this case, the fantasy of freedom. The 
injunction to enjoy is a way of remaining faithful to the fundamental fantasy of 
demanding the impossible of acting within the Symbolic in accordance to one’s 
desire. 
 Lacan’s question, Che vuoi? or, what do you want from me?, is an 
impossible question, especially in the context of unfreedom because an answer 
is not even for the subject to decide in so far as it is undecidable. Words 
fail to articulate a response with any cogency or traction. Herein lies Žižek’s 
fundamental problematic of freedom whose self-imposed logic requires desire 
to remain perpetually unsatisfied. This position prompts feminism into an area 
beyond postmodern discourse and into a more emancipatory, albeit anxious, 
structured space.  This structure has no certainty because it critiques ideology 
and those social fantasies which provide mandates for the super-ego. There is 
no answer to the question Che Vuoi? also because it is a question that directly 
implicates freedom. Any attempt to respond would be an illusion in that it would 
necessarily involve what Žižek calls the subject-presumed-to-know about desire. 
 Today feminism remains caught within this deadlock of desire and 
unfreedom. The imagined state of true emancipatory freedom leaves feminism 
as nothing more than a vanishing spectre of ideology which struggles in vain to 
traverse any social fantasy. One is always at the mercy of choice and specifically 
of the illusion that one must make the best possible choice in so far as there 
exists freedom to undertake this apparently rational task. For Žižek feminism 
poses the same political question of how we are to act. Žižek approaches this 
question as a libidinal political project: 
The most difficult thing to do is not to violate the prohibitions in a wild 
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orgy of enjoyment, but to do this without relying on someone else 
who is presupposed not to enjoy so that I can enjoy: to assume my 
own enjoyment directly, without mediation through another supposed 
purity.27
Here Žižek and feminism are surprisingly synchronized – we need to fully 
assume the burden when enjoying unfreedom. This act ought not to deceive 
either us or anyone else. On the other hand we should not appropriate freedom 
because its very existence relies on commodification. One can never be a 
subject of free-choice because freedom is always an illusion in which politically 
correct and problematically enlightened semblances of freedom are insufficient 
in deciphering the many provocations which freedom poses. The great illusion 
is that one can become a consumer of free-choice, which is a neoliberal offer 
of perversion and of desire disappearing under consumption and commodity. 
These are political ruses devised to trick us into thinking that freedom can and 
does exist, that all we require is correct insight, tolerance, inclusivity and so on. 
This kind of displacement or deterritorialisation of the subject vis-a-vis the state 
has unwelcome and even malign implications. More than ever, the academy 
is subject to capitalist interference, for example, through the imposition of a 
business model onto a teaching and research institution, including attempts to 
control or privilege specific intellectual fields and traditions. This has resulted in 
a system of internalisation and sets of standards where enjoyment of scholarship 
and intellectual pursuits are increasingly restricted. The University discourse is 
hegemonic as Lacan predicted and as Žižek states: “One of the telltale signs of 
university discourse is that the opponent is accused of being ‘dogmatic’ and 
‘sectarian’. University discourse cannot tolerate an engaged subjective stance.”28 
 Intellectual freedom resides in not only in being able to express claims 
and views in which the inner problematic workings of ideology are revealed, 
but also in being supported to do so. Here freedom holds a precarious and 
limited function – a certain promise of relative freedom is being made to those 
who know how to act within unfreedom. In order to perpetuate itself as a 
pillar of knowledge and power, the academy relies heavily on the disavowal 
of gifted scholars and to this extent identifying with enjoyment in the current 
University ethos is false consciousness. The apparent appearance of free 
choice is paradoxically more oppressive than ever and it is here that Žižek and 
feminism might be seen to conflate. Within Žižek’s formalisation of the event, 
the enjoyment of unfreedom is undoubtedly one such. Because we are already 
located within unfreedom, the only possible orientation for us is political, where 
enjoyment is experienced through mediation of the ensuing inevitable loss. In 
applying a Žižekian formalisation to unfreedom there emerges the possibility 
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for political reframing and form. Here is an explicit direction for emancipatory 
action and energy, which in turn reorients unfreedom to create the distance 
required for critique rather than succumbing to over-identification with the 
fantasy of the big Other. For feminism this is arguably disentanglement from 
postmodernism. We need to immerse ourselves in the reality of the fantasy that 
there resides enjoyment in unfreedom. It is here where profound horror lies - in 
the fantasy which elucidates limitations and oppressions. 
 The big Other of the academy however, cannot guarantee obedience from 
those both within or marginalised from the norms of academic life. To take up 
Althusser’s position, “absolute freedom on the one hand, planned research on 
the other”,29 we are caught in an ontological bind. He elaborates:
When faced with the complexity and difficulty of these massive 
problems, where it is no longer simply a question of immediate 
scientific practice (the researcher in his laboratory) but of the social 
process of the production of knowledges, of its organization and 
its politics (the question of who will govern it), one wonders: might 
not the philosopher by chance have something to say; a semblance 
of an answer to these questions? Something to say, for example, 
on the important theoretical and political alternative of freedom or 
planning in research? On the social and political conditions and goals 
of the organization of research? Or even on the method of scientific 
discovery?30 
Althusser provokes us, along with Žižek to orient ourselves towards the practice 
of our discipline.31 No longer should we direct Che vuoi? to the academy, the 
inverse must occur as an event of this provocation; the academy must speak 
to us by itself asking this question which although impossible to answer, we 
must still grapple with.  We must take up Althusser’s question precisely: what 
kind of intellectual do we want to be? Further, to invoke Žižek, how might 
such an intellectual act? These questions have to be situated alongside the 
misapprehension that surplus value under capitalism offers freedom of choice. 
Freedom, although a stumbling block which is continually rearticulating itself, 
must be confronted in order to fully assume a position of alienation and 
thus of possible transgression. It is at this point that desire is protected from 
vanishing. Here, we are taking desire literally as a counterpoint to its failure 
and in the surrender to unfreedom different intentions are revealed, including 
that authenticity of freedom as universalisable, is an illusion. More than this, 
might capitalism be in part the result of the failure of the emergence of desire 
and thus of the reduction of desire to the commodity? Ironically, unfreedom is 
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dialectically situated within the contours of transparency as providing a frame 
for enjoyment and transgression. The enjoyment of pursuing transgression is 
far greater than any kind of prohibition. One could argue that unfreedom is 
the mistake of the provocation of freedom. However, I claim the contrary, that 
unfreedom constitutes a recognisable gap in the discontinuity which freedom 
implies. Thus, we need to attend to freedom in spite of its non-existence. Here I 
am taking seriously the desire to deliberate freedom as a position of productive 
failure, as a political drive aimed at destitution, and as a devotion to anger 
and anxiety, all necessary for emancipation. This echoes Žižek’s exhortation to 
unapologetically return to enjoyment as a fundamental political act from which a 
non-prescriptive event can emerge. Such an act anxiously embraces both desire 
and its uncertain outcomes. We need to be subjects of the act and attend to 
the rupture of freedom rather than that of power.  More than this, fidelity to the 
act is a confrontation with the fantasy of unsatisfaction, with the approach to 
jouissance. Todd McGowan explicates this when stating
[t]he political act does not aim to change our mode of enjoyment or 
to create a new world in which it no longer causes subjects suffering 
but rather aims at placing this enjoyment at the center of the symbolic 
structure. The politics of the act envisions a world in which the 
relationship between the symbolic order and the real will be reversed, 
in which the real would have a structural priority.32
 
Freedom is a problematic (and arguably, missing) signifier when used to make 
feminism appear discursively legitimate. Although this consideration once had 
a function, today it invites critique because of its closeness to historicisation 
and traditional identity politics. Feminism needs to seriously address Žižek’s 
provocation of both itself and freedom as legitimate vicissitudes, freedom 
especially being problematic when its elevated status remains unchallenged, 
whereas unfreedom might be considered the rupture of the event that 
requires attention because it is a manifestation of the repeated pursuit of loss. 
Unfreedom at this conjuncture becomes the more meaningful and ethical 
pursuit in that we have the duty to unfreedom as a condition for an encounter 
with possibility, particularly within the realms of intellectual activism. Freedom 
interpellates surplus renunciation; unfreedom by contrast is enigmatic and 
relies on jouissance for it to have liveability. For feminism this liveability must 
entail enjoying what one does not have - one’s unfreedom and even having a 
passionate (dis)attachment to surpassing alienation as a critical subject position. 
Livability for a feminist intellectual also entails possible acts of transgression, 
including robust critique of feminism itself, which might beckon from a 
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new political form where unfreedom is apprehended as the most desirable 
emancipatory immanence of all.
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